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Introduction 
The WTO was established as a successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).1 Built upon a broader legal and political base than the 
GATT, it can correctly be described as the mutated GATT.2 The WTO covers 
numerous trade agreements, one of the most important bei g the WTO General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).3 This accord which came into force in 
January 1995 is the first and only set of multilater l rules that cover trade in 
services, with a broad scope and coverage of all trded services including 
financial services.4 Ethiopia has applied to accede to this system in 2003 and is 
now deeply involved in the multi-stage accession process whereby negotiations 
on trade in financial services will be one of the ky issues that determine 
Ethiopia's WTO accession. This is due to both the rol of financial services for 
the economy at large, the closed nature of the service against foreign investment 
and the nature of WTO negotiating trade in financial services considering 
potential market failures and regulatory issues in these services.5  This article 
addresses these issues. 
However, the article does not address broad questions on the economic and 
social benefits of financial market reform and liberalization. Nor does it deal 
with the benefits and positive externalities of financial market and trade policy 
reform for broader financial sector development, growth, income distribution 
                                          
1 World Trade Organization (1999), The Legal Texts, The Results of The Uruguay 
Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The 
World Trade Organization. 
2 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse (1999), The Regulation of International 
Trade, Second Edition, Routledge, See Chapter 1; An Intellectual History of 
International Trade Theory And Policy, pp. 1-24. 
3 GATS, supra note 1. 
4 The word “trade in services” has earlier history since 1973 under the OECD 
framework. See OECD (1973), Report by the High Level Group on Trade and Related 
Problems, Paris: OECD. 
5 All this can be seen from various official and non official statements. See for instance 
the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs who stated his belief that “existing 
differences on the telecom and financial sectors should not be impediments to the 
ongoing accession process as Ethiopia had expressed it  readiness to work on these 
issues on a short-to-medium term basis.”  
<http://www.mfa.gov.et/weekHornAfrica/morewha.php?wi=789>. Also see Venture 
Africa which stated that “[k]ey issues pertaining to Ethiopia joining the WTO have 
surrounded the opening up of currently state-monopolised sectors, such as the 
telecommunications and finance sectors, while the country has also been called upon 
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and poverty.6 Without denying the importance of these questions, the study 
assumes that sufficient literature exists in this realm.7 Rather, this article focuses 
on GATS commitments (of WTO Members) in financial services and its impact 
on national policy objectives. The central inquiry will be whether there exists 
any reason for Members to hold back on GATS commitments in order to retain 
the freedom to pursue certain macroeconomic and regulatory policy objectives 
of their internal economy. 
Accordingly, the evaluation of the system below shows that commitments 
under GATS need not compromise the ability of governments to pursue sound 
regulatory and macroeconomic policies and hence still leaves them with 
considerable freedom to achieve other domestic policy targets. Based on the 
examination of the possible commitment scenarios which Ethiopia can possibly 
commit to, the author argues that there exists no reason why GATS 
commitments on financial services will have to compromise Ethiopia’s ability to 
pursue sound regulatory and macro-economic policies.8  
                                          
6 On all these issues generally see John Williamson and Zdenek Drabek (1999), 
Whether and When to Liberalize Capital Account and Financial Services, World 
Trade Organization  Economic Research and Analysis Divi ion, Staff Working Paper 
ERAD-99-03; Gerard Caprio (2001), Financial Liberalization, How Far, How Fast?, 
Cambridge University Press; Stiglitz, J. E. (2000), Capital Market Liberalization, 
Economic Growth, and Instability, World Development, Vol. 28, 1075-1086; World 
Trade Organization, WTO (1997), Newsletter , Liberalizing Trade in Financial 
Services: Why It Matters? Focus No. 22; Agénor, Pierre-Richard (2001), Benefits and 
Costs of International Financial Integration: Theory and Facts, Policy Research 
working paper, 2699, the World Bank; Jonse Bane (2002), Merits and Demerits of 
Allowing Entry of Foreign Banks into the Ethiopian Banking Sector Banking Sector: 
Lessons From Selected Countries, Paper Prepared for the First International 
Conference on the Ethiopian Economy organized by EEA (January 3-5, 2002 Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia) 
7 See Kiyota, K., Peitsch, B., and M Stern, R. (2007), The Case for Financial Sector 
Liberalization in Ethiopia, Research Seminar in International Economics, Discussion 
Paper No. 565, University of Michigan and Yokohama National University;  Robert 
M. Stern et al., (2007),  Assessment of the Impact of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) on the Ethiopian Financial Services Sector, Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Addis Ababa; Gebrehiwot Ageba and Derk Bienen (2008), Ethiopia's 
Accession to The WTO and the Financial Services Sector, Munich;, Also see, 
Solomon Abay Yimer (2011), Financial Market Development, Policy and Regulation; 
The International Experience and Ethiopia’s Need for Further Reform, Academisch 
Proefschrift,  ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van 
Amsterdam.  
8 Financial services fall into two broad categories: n urance and banking, both of which 
cover a range of activities. 
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To this end, the article evaluates the existing norms under the general WTO 
framework, and in particular GATS commitments and thereby examines to what 
extent the existing framework under the WTO allows regulatory freedom and 
policy space to achieve objectives such as prudential regulation and macro-
economic policy. The article also evaluates to what extent Ethiopia’s 
commitment scenario could be shaped-up to maintain he economic and 
regulatory space stated above and the tools needed in this regard. In particular, a 
detailed analyses of some of the main provisions of the GATS and the Annex on 
Financial Services will be made to determine its impact on domestic financial 
regulation and whether Ethiopia can achieve, under the WTO’s GATS 
framework, an objective of liberalizing international trade in financial services 
while allowing itself maintain adequate domestic regulatory institutions.  
The article is organized into three major sections. The first section provides 
an overview of the nature of GATS commitments and the modality of 
negotiations. This will be followed by the second section which briefly 
discusses Ethiopia’s Accession to the WTO and Financial Services and the 
experience of recently acceded developing and leastdeveloped countries. The 
section also highlights the possible commitment scenarios with which Ethiopia 
could accede to the system. The last section consists of the major topics of 
discussion and evaluates the Ethiopian Case of financial market liberalization 
and economic policy space followed by a conclusion. 
1. The Nature of GATS Commitments and Modality of 
Negotiations  
Rather than representing itself as a liberalization agreement, GATS mainly 
provides a framework for liberalization of trade in services.9 In so doing, it is 
based on three pillars. One, it includes a framework ag eement, which contains a 
comprehensive general accord governing all possible sectors (i.e. financial 
services, telecommunications, and information technology).10 Two, special 
sector annexes and other agreements, such as the Understanding on Financial 
Services, contain provisions focusing specifically on the sector concerned.11 It 
finally, consists of scheduled commitments on market access, national treatment 
                                          
9 Peter Van den Bossche (2005), The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 
Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge University Press, p 480. 
10 See GATS Part II General Obligations and Disciplines. 
11 The list of annexes include; Annex on Article II Exemptions, Annex on Movement of 
Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, Annex on Air Transport 
Services, Annex on Financial Services, Second Annex on Financial Services, Annex 
on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services, Annex on Telecommunications, 
Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications. 
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and other commitments.12 With regard to the last point, the GATS define trade 
in financial services, like in other services, in terms of four modes of supply, 
which are respectively referred to in this article as Mode 1, Mode 2, Mode 3 and 
Mode 4: 
         For the purposes of this Agreement [i.e. GATS], trade in services is defined 
as the supply of a service: (a) from the territory f one Member into the 
territory of any other Member; (b) in the territory of one Member to the 
service consumer of any other Member; (c) by a servic  supplier of one 
Member, through commercial presence in the territory f any other 
Member; (d) by a service supplier of one Member, though presence of 
natural persons of a Member in the territory of anyother Member. 13 
These modes are in short referred to as cross-border supply of services (Mode 
1), consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial presence (Mode 3), and 
temporary movement of natural persons (Mode 4). 
In terms of market access, GATS does not provide positive and normative 
definition for market access but only provides six types of restrictions that a 
member cannot impose, unless identified in its schedule.14 Conceptually this is 
similar to the principles of quantitative market access limitations under GATT 
Art XI. 15 Generally, GATS Art XVI:2 provides for rules that prohibit members 
from imposing market access limitations on: (i) thenumber of service suppliers 
whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, xclusive service 
suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test; (ii) the total value of 
service transactions or assets; (iii) number of operations or quantity of output; 
(iv) number of natural persons supplying a service; (v) type of legal entity or 
joint venture or, finally; (vi) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in 
terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of 
individual or aggregate foreign investment, unless properly provided in their 
schedules. The existence of any limitations in these areas has to be indicated 
                                          
12 See GATS Art XX, Schedules of Specific Commitments; 1. Each Member shall set 
out in a schedule the specific commitments it undertak s under Part III of this 
Agreement. 
13 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Art I.  
14 Ibid, Art XVI. 
15 General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions: “1. No prohibitions or restrictions 
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, 
import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any 
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for 
the territory of any other contracting party.” 
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with respect to each of the four modes of supply in scheduled sectors.16 The idea 
is that such market access limitations are prohibited even if they are not 
discriminatory.17 
At the same time, GATS does not provide a comparable list in respect of 
national treatment restrictions, and it is up to memb rs to ensure that all 
potentially relevant measures are listed in sectors where commitments are 
scheduled and, if they wish, members can inscribe various types of national 
treatment limitation (e.g., regarding taxation or regulations).18 “If a member no 
longer wishes to conform to its specific commitments, it may modify its 
schedule by providing compensation in the form of alternative market access 
(even across sectors).”19 “However, this undertaking may involve difficult 
negotiation and often creates confusions regarding the member’s 
commitments.”20  
With respect to the final part of the GATS framework, the GATS schedules 
are key framework instruments providing the list of services with members’ 
commitments in terms of market access, national treatm nt and additional 
commitments. The lists of services correspond to GATT secretariat 
classification,21 which is a standardized harmonized framework also foll wing 
numerical references to the Central Product Classificat on system of the United 
Nations.22 
It is important here to recall that, depending on hw commitments are made, 
treaties liberalizing trade in services make use of either a ‘positive list’ or a 
                                          
16 This done in accordance with United Nations CPC classification (Statistical Papers, 
Series M, No.77, 1991). Also see WTO, Guidelines For The Scheduling Of Specific 
Commitments Under The General Agreement On Trade In Services (GATS), Adopted 
by the Council for Trade in Services (2001). 
17 Nicolas F. Diebold (2010), Non Discrimination In International Trade In Services 
‘Likeness’ In WTO/GATS, Cambridge University Press,  p 29. 
18 Art XVII lit 2 states; A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by 
according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally 
identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like 
services and service suppliers. 
19 International Monetary Fund, Reference Note on Trade in Financial Services, 
Prepared by the Strategy, Policy, and Review and Legal Departments (September 3, 
2010) p 5 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/090310.pdf > General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Art XXI: Modification of Schedules. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Uruguay Round, Services Sectoral Classification List, Note by the Secretariat, 
MTN.GNS/W/120 (10 July 1991). 
22 Various versions available, see for instance, C ntral Product Classification, CPC 
Version 1.1, (Updated: 21.02.2002), Version submitted to the United Nations 
Statistical Commission, 5-8 March (2002). 
 
 
206                                        MIZAN LAW REVIEW                             Vol. 6 No.2, December 2012 
     
‘negative list’ approach.23 Under a positive list approach, countries undertak 
national treatment and market access commitments specifying the type of access 
or treatment offered to services or service suppliers in scheduled sectors. The 
alternative top-down approach is based upon negative listing, whereby all 
sectors and measures are to be liberalized unless otherwise specified by 
reservations or non-conforming measures. This is the so-called “list-or-lose 
technique.”24 GATS follows a ‘hybrid trend’; a positive list for sectoral 
coverage and a negative list for limiting market access and national treatment 
commitments “(with the qualification that even here, the GATS allows for 
entries that are ‘unbound’, that is where no commitent at all are made for a 
particular mode of supply under a given sector).”25   
If a service sector is listed in the national schedul , it implies that the listing 
economy has liberalized its domestic market in thatsector for trade and is ready 
to offer market access to foreign suppliers. It applies to all the members on a 
non-discriminatory basis in the selected services area. The GATS accord is 
fairly flexible, and members have complete freedom in choosing services as 
well as the degree to which foreign services suppliers can operate in their 
domestic markets. For instance, if a member country chooses financial services 
and commits to open its domestic banking sector for foreign suppliers, it is also 
free to limit market access by limiting the number of licenses it grants. 
Additionally, it may predetermine the number of foreign bank branches it is 
going to allow to operate in its territory. Thus, the services agreement, unlike the 
GATT, provides for both market access and national tre tment limitation.26 
Consequently, despite the almost unanimous agreement that GATS is a 
technically difficult agreement to comprehend, there is also outstanding 
evidence that trade negotiations over GATS is comparatively less rigid for 
                                          
23 James Gillespie (2000), Financial Services Liberalization in the World Trade 
Organization, Harvard Law School, p 11.   
24 Sherry M. Stephenson (2001), Multilateral and Regional Services Liberalization by
Latin America and the Caribbean, A Publication of the Organization of American 
States Trade Unit (March 2001) p 30.  
25 Sherry Stephenson and Patricio Contreras, An Asymmetric Approach to Services 
Liberalization: the European Union-Mercosur Case, 
<http://www.sedi.oas.org/DTTC/TRADE/PUB/STAFF_ARTICLE/steph01_asym.as
p> (accessed Jan 2013) Also See Sherry M. Stephenson, Approaches to Liberalizing 
Services, Development Research Group of the World Bank (DECRG). The positive 
list approach was adopted specifically at the request of developing countries which 
felt they did not have the administrative resources required to determine all the 
measures that apply to each sector and to decide which they want to exempt. See Paul 
Kruger, GATS Commitments of the SADC EPA Configuration, Tralac (2009). 
26 Dilip K. Das (2005), The Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Arduous 
Issues and Strategic Responses, Palgrave Macmillan, p 131.  
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negotiating members inside the system which is equally relevant to those in the 
process of accession because of the following major peculiarities of GATS. 
First, member/acceding countries identify the sectors and sub-sectors for making 
commitments to foreign services suppliers. Although members have a schedule 
of commitments, there is no minimum requirement in this regard. Members 
have liberty to identify as small part of one sector for guaranteeing the rights of 
foreign suppliers to provide services as they please.27 Second, having identified 
the sector(s), member/acceding governments have a right to set limitations on 
market access and the degree of national treatment th y are willing to guarantee. 
Third, developing country governments frequently limit their commitments to 
one or two modes of supply through which services can be traded. Furthermore, 
if they see it is reasonable and appropriate, they ma withdraw or renegotiate 
commitments.28 This modus operandi has thus rendered the GATS accord 
essentially and relatively adaptable and accommodating.29 
2. Ethiopia’s Accession to the WTO and Financial Services: 
Setting the Stage 
Accession to the WTO is a protracted, multi-stage and complex process.30 
Essentially, the way to become a WTO member is through accession “on terms 
to be agreed” between the acceding country or customs erritory and other WTO 
members.31 The WTO Agreement does not contain any further guidelines on 
                                          
27 Generally see, Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines for the Scheduling of 
Specific Commitments Under The General Agreement On Trade In Services (GATS), 
S/L/92 (2001). 
28 GATS Article X Sub 2: In the period before the entry into effect of the results of the 
negotiations referred to in paragraph 1, any Member may, notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XXI, notify the Council on Trade in Services of 
its intention to modify or withdraw a specific commit ent after a period of one year 
from the date on which the commitment enters into force; provided that the Member 
shows cause to the Council that the modification or withdrawal cannot await the 
lapse of the three-year period provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXI. 
29 Dilip K. Das, supra note 26 above. This however does not mean that there is a ‘level 
playing field’ in the WTO accession process. Unfortunately, acceding members have, 
more often than note, less bargaining chip than incumbent members. 
30 ICTSD, An Analysis of the WTO Accession Guidelines for Least Developed 
Countries; ICTSD Programme on Competitiveness and Development; Information 
Note; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, 
Switzerland, <www.ictsd.org>, (2012), p 2. 
31 Art Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO states, “Any 
State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its 
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement 
and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be 
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what the “terms to be agreed” are or how the accession process is going to 
follow from here except that it leaves the discretion to the incumbent WTO 
members and the results of the negotiations.32  
Within the above context, the accession process can be categorized into a 
four stage process of multilateral and bilateral negotiation. The first stage starts 
when the acceding country (or customs territory as the case may be) submits its 
formal request of membership and its Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime 
(MFTR). This is a document that provides detailed sets of information on the 
country’s economic, political and legal infrastructre that mostly has to do with 
international trade. The second stage in the accession process establishes a 
designated working party which is a multilateral negotiation medium open for 
all interested WTO members and it essentially involves a fact finding process. 
At this stage members would send various sets of questions based on the MFTR 
submitted. It is an important stage which makes sure that the internal policies 
and laws of the acceding country are in compliance with the WTO Agreement. 
This stage is followed by,33 the third stage of bilateral negotiation between the 
acceding country and individual WTO members. It is perhaps the most 
important stage of the negotiation process as it determines the shape of 
commitments to be taken by the acceding country. The final stage deals with 
more administrative issues such as drafting the terms of accession protocol, 
schedules of commitments and of course involves final decision making by the 
WTO Ministerial Conference.34 
Ethiopia applied for the accession to the WTO in Jauary 2003 and the 
WTO’s General Council has established a Working Party to which the 
Government of Ethiopia submitted a Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime of 
the country for the consideration of WTO members. Until December 2012 the 
working party has met three times and Ethiopia is in the process of responding 
to its fourth set of questions from WTO members about the workings of its 
economy and trade regime.  
                                                                                                 
agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.” It is to be noted that this 
provision follows similar language contained in the accession provision of GATT 
Art. XXXIII. 
32 Ivan Marković (2009), How To Join The World Trade Organization: Some Aspects 
Of The Accession Process, Economic Annals, Volume LIV, No. 180, (January – 
March 2009) p 121. 
33 Often overlaps are also common between the multilateral negotiations under the 
working party meetings and bilateral trade negotiati ns. 
34 According to Art XII:2, “[d]ecisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial 
Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of 
accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO.” 
 
 
ETHIOPIA’ S WTO ACCESSION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION                                  209 
 
As part of achieving membership in the WTO, Ethiopia will enter into 
bilateral negotiations with various members of the WTO and perhaps will be 
required to make commitments to market access for a number of sectors and 
modes of supply in the services sector. As an LDC, Ethiopia is likely to be given 
some flexibility in assuming liberalization commitments in services.35 However, 
it should be expected that Ethiopia will be asked to agree to some threshold of 
liberalization in the financial sector, and it is important for Ethiopia to develop a 
negotiating strategy that protects its macroeconomic and regulatory interests but 
also be prepared to undertake some commitments in these sectors. Ethiopia will 
also be required to have a system of transparency in regulation that meets the 
general obligations of the GATS. 
  2.1. Experience of Recently Acceded Countries 
The vast number of agreements for the liberalization of trade in services that has 
been implemented both at the multilateral and bilateral levels has shed light on 
the negotiating strategies that might be considered by governments in order to 
obtain the full benefits of liberalization. “The main conclusion arising from 
these experiences is that no specific recipe can be prescribed for negotiating the 
liberalization of trade in services,”36 but that, whatever negotiating modality is 
chosen, it should take into account the speed with hich the economies of 
participating countries are able to open their markets to international trade and 
the degree to which the agreement is capable of conveyi g credibility.37 “The 
legitimacy of an agreement will depend upon how it is structured, while the 
                                          
35 Although it is not as effective as it ought to be, the WTO Guideline on LDCs 
accession is a notable indicator to these flexibilities. See WTO, Guidelines for 
Accession of Least-Developed Countries, WTO document WT/L/508 of 20 January 
2003, Decision of 10 December 2002. Paragraph 1 states for example “1.Market 
Access -WTO Members shall exercise restraint in seeking concessions and 
commitments on trade in goods and services from acceding LDCs, taking into 
account the levels of concessions and commitments udertaken by existing WTO 
LDCs' Members.” Also see recent efforts to “further st engthen, streamline, and 
operationalize the 2002 LDC accession guidelines,” under the Eighth WTO 
Ministerial Conference in December 2011. Accession of Least-Developed Countries 
Decision of 17 December 2011WT/L/846, (19 December 2011). 
36 Sherry Stephenson and Patricio Contreras, supra note 25. 
37 In exploring the current account implications of alternative speeds of liberalization, 
studies have shown that in a framework where a country faces a borrowing 
constraint, a gradual liberalization of trade is to be preferred to an immediate 
approach. However, this question is one that has often been debated in the economic 
literature and no universally agreed conclusion exists with respect to the optimum 
speed of undertaking trade liberalization, whether for goods or services. Generally 
see World Bank, Finance for growth: Policy choices in a volatile world, Policy 
Research Report (2001). 
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ability of members to implement the commitments to be undertaken will depend 
to a considerable extent on their level of development and particularly on the 
sophistication of their regulatory instruments”.38 The commitment scenarios of 
four recently acceded developing and least developed countries are highlighted 
below. 
2.1.1. Kingdom of Cambodia 
“Cambodia has undertaken market access commitments in at least one sub-
sector under each of 11 different services headings under the WTO 
classification”.39 The Cambodian Law on Banking and Financial Institutions and 
subsequent regulations guaranteed foreign banks rights and obligations equal to 
local banks and there was no restriction regarding foreign ownership of banks.40 
Accordingly, Cambodia made commitments on: acceptance of deposits and 
other repayable funds from the public, lending of all types, including, among 
others, consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring a d financing of commercial 
transaction, and all payment and money transmission ervice, including credit, 
charge and debit cards, travellers’ cheques and bankers drafts.41 Thus Cambodia 
did not commit to financial services under sub-sectors B(c), (e), (f)–(l).42 
Cambodia maintained that it will unbound these sectors until the Government 
determines what types of entities can conduct these s rvices, the related laws 
and regulation are established, and such business is authorized by the 
government or other relevant designated authority. Thus, the commitments for 
subsectors (a), (b) and (d) only refer to commercial banking. 
2.1.2. Cape Verde 
The accession schedule of Cape Verde shows that, Cape Verd  made market 
access commitments on Mode 2 and 3 on sectors such as (v) acceptance of 
deposits and other repayable funds from the public; (vi) lending of all types, 
including consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring and financing of 
commercial transaction; (vii) financial leasing; (viii) all payment and money 
                                          
38 Sherry Stephenson and Patricio Contreras, supra note 25. 
39 Sok Siphana (2005), Lessons from Cambodia’s Entry into the World Trade 
Organization, Asian Development Bank Institute, ADBi Publishing -11/05, p 51. 
40 Samnang Chea, et al., Trade in Services in Cambodia, ASEAN Economic Forum, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Topics/Services/
Cambodia-Asean_services.pdf> (last accessed April 2012). 
41 World Trade Organization, Report Of The Working Party on The Accession Of 
Cambodia, Addendum Part II- Schedule of Specific Commitments in Services List of 
Article II MFN Exemptions,  T/ACC/KHM/21/Add.2 (2003). 
42 These sectors are (c) Financial leasing, (e) Guarantees and commitments, (f) Trading 
for own account or for account of customers, (g) Participation in issues of all kinds of 
securities, (h)  Money broking and finally (i) Asset management. 
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transmission services, including credit, charge and debit cards, travellers’ 
cheques and bankers drafts; (ix) guarantees and commitments; (x) trading for 
own account or for account of customers, whether on an exchange, in an over-
the-counter market or otherwise, the following: (A) money market instruments 
(including cheques, bills, certificates of deposits); (B) foreign exchange; (C) 
derivative products including, but not limited to, futures and options; (D) 
exchange rate and interest rate instruments, including products such as swaps, 
forward rate, etc.43 Cape Verde also made commitments on areas of (xi) 
participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including underwriting and 
placement as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of services 
related to such issues (xii) money broking (xiii) asset management, such as cash 
or portfolio management, all forms of collective investment management, 
pension fund management, custodial, depository and trust services (xiv) 
settlement and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, 
derivative products, and other negotiable instruments, while at the same time 
Cape Verde forfeited the privilege to discriminate against foreigners except on 
Mode 4, in accordance with limitations under horizontal commitments. In the 
meantime Cape Verde, in its financial services head note, maintained that it will 
permit the establishment of branches for committed sub-sectors in insurance, 
banking and securities within 10 years from the date of Cape Verde's accession 
to the WTO.44 
2.1.3. Kingdom of Nepal 
The schedules of services commitments of the Kingdom of Nepal shows that 
Nepal made full market access and national treatment commitments (except on 
Mode 4) on all Banking and other Financial Services, 45 which includes; (a) 
acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public, (b) lending of 
all types, including, inter alia, consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring and 
financing of commercial transactions, (c) financial leasing (d) all payment and 
money transmission services (e) guarantees and commitments (f) trading for 
own account or for account of customers, whether on an exchange, an over-the-
counter market, participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including under-
writing and placement as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of 
service – related to such issues. It further includes (h) money broking, (i) asset 
                                          
43 Cape Verde, Report of The Working Party on The Accession of Cape Verde: 
Addendum, Part II Schedule of Specific Commitments in Services List of Article II 
MFN Exemptions, WT/ACC/CPV/30/Add.2. 
44 Ibid. 
45 For a detailed review of the financial services reform in Nepal see, Project Research 
& Management Associates P. Ltd (2007), Study on Financial Sector Reform in 
Nepal; Overall Impact and Public Ownership of Financial Institution, South Asian 
Network of Economic Institutes –SANEI.  
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management, such as cash or portfolio management, all forms of collective 
investment management, pension fund management, custodial depository and 
trust services, (j) settlement of and clearing servic s for financial assets, 
including securities, derivative products, and other n gotiable instruments, (k) 
provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data processing 
and related software by providers of other financial services, and (l) advisory 
services on all the activities listed above.46  
In the meantime, Nepal maintained under the services s hedule head notes 
that financial services in the form of operations identified in the Schedule can be 
carried out in Nepal only through a locally incorporated company. Importantly, 
branches for insurance services and wholesale banking were scheduled to be 
allowed only as of 1 January 2010.47 In addition, only a licensed commercial 
bank, a licensed specialized bank or a registered finance company may accept 
deposits. Only financial institutions with rating of at least 'B' by ‘Credit Rating 
Agency’ e.g. MOODI, Standard & Poor can have commercial presence in 
Nepal. Another important limitation is the total foreign shareholding in any 
institution providing financial services which is limited to 67 per cent of the 
issued share capital. It has, nevertheless, been bou d for the existing foreign 
financial service providers as to their scope of operation and equity structure. 
Nepal also maintained that the shares held by foreign nationals and foreign 
financial institutions in their locally incorporated companies are not transferable 
without the prior written approval of the Nepal Rastr  Bank (the central bank) or 
any other competent authority as the case may be. Moreover, representative 
offices in Nepal may not be engaged in commercial business.48 
2.1.4. Jordan 
Jordan’s GATS commitments in financial services are not different from the 
other recently acceded states. Essentially, Jordan m de full market access and 
national treatment commitments on banking services such as; acceptance of 
deposits and other repayable funds from the public, guarantees and 
commitments and money broking.49 The only exceptions were that Jordan bound 
a national treatment exception on mode one that real p operty in Jordan may not 
be mortgaged to banks outside Jordan and that national treatment on Mode 4 is 
unbound, except as indicated in the horizontal section while, branches of foreign 
banks are required to have a resident regional manager. Jordan also made 
                                          
46 World Trade Organization (2004), Trade in Services, The Kingdom of Nepal, 
Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/139.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 World Trade Organization (1999), Report of the Working Party on the  Accession of 
Jordan, Schedule CXLVIII-Jordan, WT/ACC/JOR/33/Add.2, WT/MIN(99)/9/Add.2.  
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market access and national treatment commitments with respect to, lending of 
all types including consumer credit, factoring, mortgage credit, and financing of 
commercial transaction, financial leasing and all payment and money 
transmission services, except that under mode threemarket access is limited to 
services provided through banks and specialized financial companies and like 
the above commitments branches of foreign banks are required to have a 
resident regional manager.50 
Jordan made full national treatment commitments on the first three modes 
with the usual limitations on Mode 4 and at the same time made market access 
commitments on Mode 1 and Mode 2 with an exception to derivative products 
which are unbound. On Mode 3, access is restricted to: banks and financial 
services companies constituted in Jordan, in the form f public shareholding 
company, Limited Liability Company or a limited partnership in Shares 
Company.51 Finally, with respect to advisory and other auxiliary financial 
services on all the activities including credit refer nce and analysis, investment 
and portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisition  and on corporate 
restructuring and strategy and provision and transfer o  financial information as 
related to financial data processing and related software by providers of other 
financial services, Jordan made market access and national treatment 
commitments except with respect to the former access which is restricted to 
financial services companies constituted in Jordan.52 
2.2. The Financial Services Market, Policy and Ethiopia’s 
Possible Commitment Scenarios 
The current picture of financial services in Ethiopia is dominated by banks. 
“Banks are the dominant financial institutions in the country” and they “account, 
on average, for 96% of total gross financial assets. Non-banks account only for 
about 4%”.53 Unfortunately, the current state of performance of the banking 
services in the country is one of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa. “Ethiopia has 
a very low rural banking density and consequently one f the lowest financial 
inclusion ratios of Sub-Saharan Africa, with only 14 percent of adults having 
access to credit. Most of the bank branches are in urban areas. The ratio of the 
rural population to a commercial bank or a Micro Finance Institution (MFI) 
branch is one branch to 125,158 people. Thus it is not surprising that only one 




53 Ebisa Deribie (2012), The Effects of Post 1991 Era financial sector deregulations in 
Ethiopia: An Inspirational guide for agribusiness, Research Journal of Agricultural 
Science and Review ISSN 2315-6880 Vol. 1(4) pp. 81-87 (October 2012) p 82. 
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percent of the rural population have bank accounts”.54 In the meantime, Ethiopia 
is the host of one of the fastest growing microfinance institutions in the World. 
By the end of 2005, “26 MFIs had 1,277,939 borrowing clients with an 
aggregated portfolio of 1.622 billion Birr”.55 “Ethiopia’s insurance industry is 
relatively undeveloped which is exemplified by the s ctor’s low penetration 
levels – there are an estimated 0.3 million formal insurance clients in 
Ethiopia”.56 According to the Centre for Financial Regulation and I clusion 
report; “insurance premiums, including life and general insurance, totaled US 
$105 million in the 2006/07 financial year represented merely 0.2% of GDP in 
2007 - while in Kenya and Namibia premiums represent 2.5% and 8.1% of GDP 
respectively”.57 
From the public governance side of the market, major ec nomic policy and 
regulatory interests revolve around areas of financial stability and banking 
regulation. The Ethiopian legal regime in banking services regulation takes the 
form of nationality and investment limitations in the banking sector.  
The typical forms of limitations in relation to investment in banks are: 
the nationality requirement restriction, the restriction on maximum 
amount of investment (shares) to be held by a single investor/related 
investors, and the prohibition of an investor having allegedly substantial 
investment in one bank (influential shareholder) from investing in any 
other bank. On the other hand, Ethiopian law has delineated the scope of 
banking activities and it has also limited the scope of equity 
participation of banks in other firms.58  
Financial stability issues in Ethiopia are centred towards the closed nature of 
international capital account and restrictions on the free convertibility of foreign 
exchange. Concerns in this regard are highly tied with the aim to maintain price 
                                          
54
  World Bank, Enabling Environment: Access to Financial Services and
Transportation, technical brief (2012) <http://www.agrifinfacility.org/enabling-
environment-access-financial-services-ethiopia> (l st accessed Jan 2012). 
55 Alemayehu Yirsaw (2008), The Performance of Micro Finance Institutions in 
Ethiopia: A case of six microfinance institutions, Addis Ababa University Master 
Thesis, p 6. 
56 AEMFI, Association of Ethiopian Microfinance institutions, Overview of Ethiopia’s 
Insurance Industry,<http://www.aemfi-ethiopia.org/.../6-
articles.html?...14%3Ainsurance-overvi> ... (Last accessed Jan 2012) Generally see 
Hailu Zeleke (2007), Insurance in Ethiopia: Historical Development, Present Status 
and Future Challenges. Addis Ababa: Master Printing Press. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Getnet Temechew (2010), Investment Limitations in and by Banks in Ethiopia, Addis 
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and exchange rate stability, and achieving balance of payments equilibrium 
since these are ongoing problems in the country. 
Currently, Ethiopia does not have limits on the number of banks, insurers and 
microfinance institutions that have to be licensed. It, however, prohibits the 
ownership of these institutions by foreign nationals nd foreign owned juridical 
persons.59 This aspect of financial sector development was also common in most 
developed, developing and transition economies of Eastern Europe, Asia and 
Latin America.60 But in due time, most of these countries, including African 
states have removed these types of restrictions and opened up their financial 
markets for foreign investment after the reforms of the late 1980s and the 
1990s.61 The works of international and regional institutions, primarily the IMF, 
World Bank and WTO, were instrumental in this regard.62 
The first among the four modes of supply, in GATS Part I terms, relates to 
cross border supply of financial services. In this particular mode, the experience 
of WTO Members and recently acceded countries shows that Ethiopia can 
possibly maintain the status quo of whatever practic lly exists now. It may also 
seem viable to achieve this in the accession negotiations as this is one of the 
most important modes which is highly dependent on international capital 
transfers and hence possibly entails capital movement volatility. Such strategy 
also seems wise considering other objectives of financial market liberalizations 
such as technology transfer and transfer of managerial skills or any other 
expectations of positive spillover from openness. Compared to Mode 3 trade for 
instance, liberalization of cross-border trade in financial services carries more 
                                          
59 See Investment Proclamation, (Proclamation No 769/2012). And the regulation, 
Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors 
Council of Ministers Regulation, Regulation No 270/2012 Art 3. For former legal 
instruments see Re-Enactment of the Investment Proclamation,  Proclamation No. 
280/2002, According to the Investment Proclamation, The banking, insurance, and 
micro-credit sectors,  are restricted to domestic investors; Also see Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia, Licensing and Supervision of Banking Business 
Proclamation No. 84/1994, Art 4(2); Also see Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Banking Business Proclamation No. 592/2008, Arts 4(1)(d), 2(5) & 9. 
60 Earl H. Fry, The Politics of International Investment (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1983) p.133, Also see Ha-Joon Chang, Foreign Investment Regulation in Historical 
Perspective: Lessons for the Proposed WTO Agreement on Investment, University of 
Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Politics, (2003) p 1; Jeswald.W.Salacuse, 
Direct foreign investment and the law in Developing Countries, Foreign Investment 
Journal, Vol.15,No. 2, (2000) p. 389-390. 
61 See Solomon Abay Yimer, supra note 7, p 26. 
62 Generally see Ahn, Dukgeun, Linkages between International Financial and Trade 
Institutions: IMF, World Bank and WTO, Journal of World Trade 34(4). 
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risks and fewer benefits.63 The experiences of recently acceded countries also 
seem to allow this scenario. But, of course, new preced nts can always be set 
any time and hence pressure to commit to this mode is expected. 
On the other hand, compared to other service sectors, Ethiopia is less likely 
to bear pressure to commit in Mode 2 financial services. Considering the virtual 
impossibility of regulation against individuals and firms consuming services 
abroad, this mode also seems the less difficult for Ethiopia to swallow. The 
experience of recently acceded countries also shows that with the exception of 
Nepal, this mode has been fully liberalized by all acceded countries. Indeed, the 
consumption of financial services abroad is almost impossible to monitor or 
distinguish from other modes of trade.64 Therefore, offering full liberalization of 
this mode might be a wise tactical move by any acceding country as it 
constitutes a liberalization proposal without incurring any cost.65 
With respect to the third mode of supply, i.e., commercial presence, Ethiopia 
currently has one of the few overtly protected financi l markets in the world.66 
Primarily, the current system does not allow commercial presence of foreigners 
in the financial sector. This perhaps will be the most important subject of 
negotiations in Ethiopia’s accession bid and possibly the entire accession 
negotiations can become contingent upon the commitment result of this 
particular service sector and mode of supply. Thus, potentially, there exists a 
very small chance that Ethiopia will be able to join the system without 
committing anything in this particular sector. But still there can be different 
scenarios of commitment levels.  
For starters, one option is entry through equity ownership, with significant, 
but less than 100% share. This still would allow the various macro and 
efficiency benefits expected out of foreign partaking. Basically, the increased 
capital base would increase availability, accessibility and affordability of 
finance to the economy in general.67 The other scenario is full commercial 
                                          
63 Gebrehiwot Ageba and Derk Bienen, supra note 7, p 13. 
64 Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl And Pierre Sauvé (2003), GATS and The Regulation of 
International Trade In Services, Cambridge University Press (2008) pp. 183-187, 
Also see Sydney J. Key (2003), The Doha Round and Financial Services 
Negotiations, The AEI Press, Washington DC, p 8. 
65 Gebrehiwot Ageba and Derk Bienen, supra note 7. 
66 Kozo Kiyota et al. (2007), The Case for Financial Sector Liberalization in Ethiopia, 
Research Seminar In International Economics, Gerald R. Ford School of Public 
Policy, Discussion Paper No. 565, p 4. 
67 Generally see Kevin Davis, Competition Policy in Banking and Financial Services, 
<http://kevindavis.com.au/secondpages/workinprogress/Competition%20Policy%20i
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presence. This is both economically useful and will also address other 
regulators’ concerns that Ethiopia faces. Basically under this scenario, the 
subsidiary's solvency is determined by its own financi l performance, and in 
accordance with the laws and regulations set by the E iopian government. This 
strategy could also be accompanied by the type of market access limitations 
enumerated under Art XVI.68 The experience of recently acceded counties 
shows that market access limitations in this mode are less limited compared to 
limitations on national treatment, whereas in this latter case as well most of 
recently acceded countries have eliminated all or virtually all limitations on 
national treatment.69 
With regard to the last mode of supply, Mode 4, the issues will be highly 
entrenched with the commitment scenarios undertaken under the 3rd mode. 
Moreover, there is less pressure from the accession negotiations and perhaps 
less concern from domestic economic considerations wards committing to this 
mode. In this respect almost none of the recently acceded countries made 
commitments in this mode. This reinforces any strategy Ethiopia could have in 
this regard. 
3. Financial Market Liberalization and Domestic Policy 
Space 
The financial services sector is a key to any properly functioning economy.70 
Essentially, the sector facilitates financial interm diation in the economy (i.e. 
mobilization and allocation of funds). Financial services are also important for 
the economy as a whole since it allows financial transfers and payments. Hence, 
a healthy and stable financial service is essential for sustainable economic 
                                          
68 These include limitations on the number of service suppliers ( e.g. such as ceilings on 
the total number of banks); limitations on the total v lue of transactions on assets 
(e.g. foreign bank subsidiaries limited to X per cent of total domestic assets of all 
banks); limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity 
of service output (e.g. restrictions on amount of lending capital for foreign firms); 
limitations on the total number of natural persons (i  particular non-nationals) that 
may be employed in the sector (or the share of wages paid to foreign labour); 
restrictions on, or requirements of, specific types of legal entity through which that 
service may be supplied (e.g. commercial presence ex lude representative offices, 
foreign companies required to establish subsidiaries, commercial presence must take 
the form of a partnership, commercial presence must take some form of 
incorporation); and limitations on the participation f foreign capital. 
69 See section 2.1 above in this article. 
70 Gary Gorton and Andrew Winton (2002), Financial Intermediation, Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center, p 1. 
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growth.71 Conversely, instability in financial service can potentially have 
economy-wide effects (local or global) and can be se n most dramatically in the 
crisis in Latin America, East Asia and the US financi l crisis where fragility in 
the financial system spilt over to other countries in the region and the World at 
large.72 
The process of review of domestic regulation and the accompanying 
regulatory reform go hand-in-hand with services liberalization under any given 
approach. It is a common understanding that services liberalization involves 
essentially the removal of discriminatory regulation, whether in quantitative or 
qualitative form, while nondiscriminatory restraints are a matter of domestic 
regulation. This distinction allows countries to tackle the reduction of barriers to 
services trade, on the one hand, and the reform of domestic regulation, on the 
other.73 In the WTO accession context, the challenge today is on how to fine 
tune financial sector liberalization with the necessary legislative and 
institutional reforms which will enable it to easily accomplish the objectives of 
financial liberalization without at the same time taring down legitimate 
regulatory instruments and risk financial collapse. 
Accordingly, it is important to keep in mind that services liberalization and 
domestic regulatory reform must go forward in a parallel and unified path so 
that liberalization does not occur faster than the necessary regulatory reform in 
service sectors that are susceptible to specific types of market failure. Thus the 
Ethiopian government is expected to set appropriate sequencing and moderating 
infrastructure parallel to market liberalization efforts. In the mean time, it should 
                                          
71 John Bonin and Paul Wachtel, Financial Sector Development in Transition, 
Economies: Lessons from the First Decade, Financial Markets, Institutions & 
Instruments, V. 12, No. 1, New York University Salom n Center (February 2003) p 1 
72 International Finance Division Research Department Nepal Rastra Bank, A
Comparative Review of Financial Services Sector Commit ents in The Selected 
SAARC Member Countries: Relevant Experiences For Nepal’s Accession to WTO, p 
4. 
73 This issue has been extensively discussed in the context of the classification of 
market access and national treatment commitments under GATS. See Feketekuty, 
Geza (2000), Improving the Architecture of the General Agreement o  Trade in 
Services, in Sherry Stephenson (eds.), Services Trade in the Western Hemisphere: 
Liberalization, Integration, and Reform, Brookings Institution Press, Chapter 1; Low, 
Patrick and Aaditya Mattoo, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to 
Liberalization under GATS, (in) Pierre Sauvé and Robert M. Stern, GATS 2000: New 
Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, Brookings Institution Press, Chapter 15 
Also see, Stephenson Sherry, GATS and Regional Integration, in Pierre Sauve and 
Robert Stern (eds.), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000, Chapter 18. 
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be noted that efforts towards multilateral trade negotiations, typically the WTO, 
do not obstruct the government’s policy options to achieve these objectives.  
Four types of government intervention or involvement are believed to have 
impact on the financial services sector, namely: (i) macroeconomic policy 
management, (ii) prudential regulations, (iii) non-prudential regulation to pursue 
various public policy objectives other than that falling under, and (iv) trade 
restrictions concerning market access or national tre tment.74 A brief discussion 
is made on three of these issues in the context of Ethiopia’s accession to the 
WTO. Under the GATS, item (ii) is dealt with by parag aph 2 of the Annex on 
Financial Services, and (iii) by Article VI. Item (iv) is dealt with by Articles 
XVI and XVII.  
3.1. Financial Sector Liberalization and Capital Ac ount 
Liberalization 
3.1.1. GATS on Capital Movements 
Global experience with financial deregulation and liberalization has been a mix 
of bewildering array of experiences. “Several countries have suffered serious 
banking crises following the opening of their financial markets, and, as formal 
econometric work shows, banking crises have generally been good predictors of 
currency crises.”75 GATS does not, in principle, oblige a Member to allow 
international capital mobility.76 It is to be noted that liberalization of capital 
movements is distinct from – but closely related to – liberalization of trade in 
financial services.77 For example, provision of financial information byforeign 
financial organizations is entirely unrelated to capital account liberalization.78 In 
the meantime, if a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation 
to the cross-border supply of a service and if the cross-border movement of 
capital is an essential part of the service itself, the Member is consequently 
                                          
74 See WTO (1997), Opening Markets in Financial Services and the Role of the GATS, 
WTO Special Studies, Geneva.  
75 Peter K. Cornelius (2000), Trade in Financial Services, Capital Flows, and the 
Value-at-Risk of Countries, Harvard Institute for International Development, 
Research Note RN-00-2, p 3. 
76 Victor Murinde and Cillian Ryan (2003), The Implication of WTO and GATS for the 
Banking Sector in Africa, Blackwell Publishing Ltd ; See footnote text 9, p 185. 
77 A. Kireyev (2002), Liberalization of Trade in Financial Services and Financial 
Sector (analytical approach), IMF Working Paper WP/02/138, pp 10-14. Also see 
Tamirisa, N. et al (2000), Trade Policy in Financial Services, IMF Working Paper 
WP/00/31.  
78 See A.Kireyev, Ibid, pp. 10-14. 
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committed to allow such movement of capital.79 Further, if a Member 
undertakes a market access commitment in relation to the supply of a service 
through commercial presence, that Member is committed to allow related 
inflows of capital.80  
Thus, the establishment of a commercial presence in a host country by a 
foreign service supplier involves both trade in services under the GATS and 
international capital transactions.81 In theory, it is still possible that once 
established, a subsidiary of a foreign financial firm could conduct its on-going 
activities without engaging in additional international capital transactions.82 
However, its activities would need to be limited to transactions with host-
country residents involving domestic financial asset .83 This may happen in very 
rare circumstances – and certainly not in a small developing economy. 
WTO Members do not seem to have any obligation with respect to capital 
flows related to consumption abroad and capital outflows related to commercial 
presence.84 Hence, GATS primarily mandates Members to liberalize nward 
                                          
79 See A. Cornford (2003), The Multilateral  Negotiations  on  Financial  Services : 
current issues  and  future  directions.  
80 This is particularly provided under footnote 8 of Art XVI GATS which states: “[l]f a 
Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a 
service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of Article I and if 
the cross-border movement of capital is an essential part of the service itself, that 
Member is thereby committed to allow such movement of capital. If a Member 
undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through 
the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c)of Article I, it is thereby 
committed to allow related transfers of capital into its territory.” 
81 As we all know, the capital account covers capital movements for investments while 
the current account covers (the payment of) imports and exports of goods and 
services. 
82 This could for instance be a situation where the for ign subsidiary wishes to raise its 
capital from equity or debt capital from the host economy itself. Thus only later, for 
example, when the bank wishes to repatriate profits from its foreign operations, may 
a capital flow occur, but out of the host country. See for instance Sydney J. Key, 
Financial Services (in) Patrick F. J. Macrory et al, (eds.) The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Volume 1, Springer, 2005, p 
962. 
83 Under standard balance-of-payments accounting, however, even if the earnings of the 
subsidiary were reinvested, they would be regarded as additional foreign direct 
investment by the parent in the subsidiary.  
84 This can be inferred by reading Article XI, the provision on international payments 
and transfers together with footnote 8 to Article XVI, the market-access provision. 
See Wendy Dobson, Financial Services and International Trade Agreements: The 
Development Dimension (in) Aaditya Mattoo et al, (eds.), A Handbook of 
International Trade in Services, Oxford (2008) p 294; For Mode 2 transactions, not 
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transfers of international payments in connection with services that are provided 
pursuant to a specific commitment made under the GATS.85 “The bottom-line is 
that if a country makes a commitment to liberalize trade with respect to a 
particular financial service in the GATS, it is also making a commitment to 
liberalize most capital movements associated with the rade liberalization 
commitment”.86 The country is not, however, making an across-the-board 
commitment to freedom of capital movements.87  
While GATS Article XI, as a general rule, prohibits any restrictions on 
international transfers and payments on sectors subject to commitments, it 
permits exceptions in five sets of circumstances. These are: (1), restrictions 
which are applied to safeguard the balance of payments in accordance with 
Article XII GATS; (2), in case a general exception applies in accordance with 
Art XIV and XIVbis GATS; (3), in case an exception applies in accordance with 
Para 2 lit. a, of the Annex on Financial Services; (4), in the case of current 
transactions, if consistent with the rights and obligations of the members of the 
IMF under the IMF Agreement; or (5), in the case of capital transactions, at the 
request of the IMF. The types of restrictions that c n possibly lie under GATS 
Article XII and Para 2 (lit a) of the Annex on Financial Services will be 
discussed in the subsections below. 
The first of the other three exceptions relates to the case of current 
transactions, which are consistent with the rights and obligations of the members 
                                                                                                 
even this obligation exists. Rather, under Mode 2 countries seem to be free to set 
restrictions on capital transfers related to servics supplied under the market access 
commitments made. As Kono et al. (1997, p. 23) emphasize, “(t)he GATS focuses 
upon seeking improvements in the terms and conditios of market access and non-
discriminatory treatment for foreign suppliers of financial services, and not on the 
question of how far and how fast a government liberalizes capital account 
restrictions.” See Peter K. Cornelius, supra note 75 above. 
85 Christian Tietje et al. (2010), Liberalization and Rules on Regulation in the Field of 
Financial Services in Bilateral Trade and Regional Integration Agreements; A 
Scientific Study, Halle, September, p 7. 
86 Sydney J. Key, Financial Services (in) Patrick F. J. Macrory et al, (eds.) supra note 
82; See GATS Article XI: Payments and Transfers. 
87 Sydney J. Key (2003), supra note 64. Also see Diemo Dietrich et al (2010), 
Liberalization and Rules on Regulation in the field of Financial Services in Bilateral 
Trade and Regional Integration Agreements, Institute of Economic Law (TELC), 
Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, p 12. Inthe words of Dietrich et al 
“GATS does not aim at the overall liberalization of international payments and 
transfers. However, it provides for a ‘conditional obligation’ according to which 
WTO members must not restrict current transactions a d capital transactions that 
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of the IMF under the IMF Agreement. This exception permits certain 
transitional or, with the IMF’s prior approval, temporary restrictions in 
accordance with Article XIV and VIII of the IMF Agreement.88 The second 
exception refers to situations where the IMF Agreemnt permits any of these 
practices and, to the extent that they relate to current transactions, the IMF 
Agreement will take precedence over the GATS to avoid any inconsistencies 
between IMF and GATS rights and obligations.89 The reference made to ‘the 
request of the Fund’ “relates to Art VI Section 1 [of the] IMF Agreement under 
which the IMF may request a Member to impose capital controls”,90 to prevent 
“the use of the IMF’s resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of 
capital”.91 Therefore, as with current transactions, the IMF Agreement takes 
precedence regarding capital transactions, but only if (direct or indirect) capital 
controls actually have been requested by the IMF.92  
The last exception refers to the General Exceptions u der Arts XIV and 
XIV bis. These exceptions to Article XI provide for exceptions to a Member’s 
obligations under the GATS in a number of circumstances. These articles refer 
to concerns such as measures maintained to protect public morals or to maintain 
public order, measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations, 
essential security interests etc. This essentially means that a member can 
maintain measures such as seizure or blocking of assets in connection with 
bankruptcy or to enforce criminal procedures. Thus, even though such measures 
can, strictly speaking, amount to restrictions of international transfers and payments, 
they prevail over other GATS rules for public policy reasons by operation of 
Articles XIV and XIVbis over the rules of Article XI. 
Thus, we can see that GATS does not oblige WTO members to fully 
liberalize capital flows related to the activities of such local establishments. This 
means that the opening up of financial services is consistent with an option to 
maintain certain capital account restrictions. “This is particularly important to 
                                          
88 Rüdiger Wolfrum, et al (2008), WTO – Trade in Services, Max Planck Commentaries 
on World Trade Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,  p 255; Generally see Deborah E. 
Siegel (2002), Legal Aspects Of The IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles Of 
Agreement And The WTO Agreements, 562 The American Journal Of International 
Law, Vol. 96:561.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Rüdiger Wolfrum, et al, supra note 88, p 256, Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, IMF, Article VI Capital Transfers, Section 1.  
91 Joshep Gold (1991), Borrowing by the IMF, ultra vires and other problems, (in) 
Jacob A. Frenkel and Morris Goldstein, (eds.) International Financial Policy: Essays 
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most of developing countries, where domestic financial markets remain 
underdeveloped and small, and balance of payments positions are weak”.93 
3.1.2. The Ethiopian Case  
Ethiopia authorizes the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) – the central bank – to 
regulate the supply of money and interest rates of financial institutions, the use 
of foreign currency, exercise of foreign exchange transactions and exchange 
rates of the financial institutions, and the conditions, limitations and 
circumstances under which residents of the country and the financial institutions 
can hold foreign currency and instruments of payment in foreign currency.94 
Thus, for the moment (considering the closed status of the financial services 
sector now), there does not seem to be any case where t  practice of the 
National Bank would essentially violate the main principles and the important 
exceptions of the GATS provisions. 
The Ethiopian government is expected to negotiate demands by considering 
what should be done in the accession negotiations t achieve legitimate 
economic goals under this issue.  In principle, “domestic reform and trade policy 
reform can be seen as precursors of capital account liberalization”.95 A sound 
and diverse financial system will better intermediate volatile international 
capital flows. However, a variety of sequences seen in various countries will 
demonstrate that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to sequencing. For 
example, Taiwan has not fully deregulated its domestic financial markets and 
still imposes some restrictions on the capital account, but it permits market 
access by foreign financial service providers.96 South Korea restricted both 
market access and capital flows, yet in 1997 it experienced a severe balance of 
payments crisis related in part to a weak record of domestic reform.97 Thus, 
                                          
93Yun-Hwan Kim (2002), Financial Opening Under The WTO Agreement In Select d 
Asian Countries: Progress And Issues, A ian Development Bank, ERD Working 
Paper No. 24 (September 2002), p 2. 
94 The National Bank of Ethiopia Establishment (as Amended) Proclamation No 
591/2008, Articles 5 (4), 5 (5-6 and 9-10) and 19-2; Micro-Financing Business 
Proclamation No. 626/2009, Article 28 (1). 
95 Wendy Dobson, supra note 84. 
96 Ibid, p 294. 
97 Ibid, Also according to Yoon Je Cho “The immediate cause of the crisis was the run 
of foreign creditors.” “The accelerated opening up to international capital flows from 
1994 without adequate supervision also contributed to the currency crisis. See Yoon 
Je Cho, The Role of Poorly Phased Liberalization in Korea’s Financial Crisis (in) 
Gerard Caprio (eds.) (2001), Financial Liberalization, How Far, How Fast?, 
Cambridge University Press, p 159.  
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there is no clear-cut evidence which correctly shows the relevant relationship 
between financial market liberalization and financil risis.98  
Moreover, it is to be noted that financial services liberalization does not 
necessarily imply complete capital account liberalization. Yet, it is important to 
find strategic ways to limit the country’s exposure to potential financial crises. 
For instance, it appears that the relationship betwe n trade in financial services 
and capital flows is particularly close under Mode 1 (cross-border supply) than 
the other modes. The experience of WTO members also shows that at present, 
relatively few countries have made commitments under Mode 1, reflecting fears 
that a more liberal trade policy in this mode could seriously undermine financial 
stability while its potential gains are in contrast limited. Studies have shown the 
various contrasting effects of commitments under th various modes of GATS 
commitments. The table below shows a simple representation of the effects of 
financial services commitments on capital flows and the financial system as 
affected by the mode of supply and range of instruments. 
Table 1: Effects of Financial Services Commitments on Capital Flows and the Financial 
System, As Affected by the Mode of Supply and Range of Instruments 99 
 By Mode of Supply  By Range of Instruments 
which can be supplied 
Mode 1 Mode 3 Narrow * Broad  
Capacity Building 
Improved transparency/information Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Incentive to improve regulation/ supervision Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Infrastructure/ market development Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Risk management Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Capital Flows 
More capital flows Yes Limited ** ** 
Bias toward short-term lending Strong Weak Possibly strong Weak 
Increased volatility  Strong Weak Possibly strong Weak 
Efficiency/local benefits 
More competition/efficiency  Strong  Strong Weak Strong 
Skills/technology transfer Weak Strong Weak Strong 
Local employment creation Weak Strong weak Strong 
* Commitments exclude or limit provision of important instruments/allow only lending and deposit-taking. 
** Depends on the instrument and mode of supply permitted, and market conditions 
                                          
98 Eswar S. Prasad, Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries, Some 
Empirical Evidence, IMF (2003), p. 1. Also see Arturo Galindo (2002), “Financial 
Liberalization: Does It Pay to Join the Party? [with Comments]”, Economía, Vol. 3, 
No. 1. 
99 Adopted from Masamichi Kono and Ludger Schuknecht (1998), Financial Services 
Trade, Capital Flows, and Financial Stability, World Trade Organization Economic 
Research and Analysis Division, Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-12.  
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In light of the severe financial turmoil over the last few years, some countries 
could have pursued a more cautious approach to capital account convertibility 
and financial services trade.100 Rather than dismantling barriers to trade in 
financial services across-the-board, it might have be n preferable for them to at 
least maintain restrictions under Mode 1. This applies primarily to countries 
with weak financial systems. For these countries, they caution against modal 
neutrality, i.e., equal liberalization commitments between, for example, cross-
border supply and supply through commercial presence.  
While in their view, “…countries with stable financial systems and a sound 
macroeconomic and regulatory framework have every rason to apply a very 
broad liberalization strategy and commit to far-reaching trade liberalization 
across all modes of supply,” they recognize that in countries with weak financial 
systems potentially volatile capital flows can be highly destabilizing, resulting 
in banking and currency crises.101 “Thus, with respect to these countries they 
counsel to confine commitments to the commercial presence of foreign 
institutions, requiring only limited liberalization of capital flows in the GATS 
context”.102 Hence, for Ethiopia it seems preferable to save this policy space 
against GATS Mode 1 commitments in financial services until the necessary 
domestic capacity in regulatory capacity and a sound economic setting are 
created. 
3.2. Problems in Balance of Payments  
3.2.1. General features of BOP and policy options 
An unsustainable Balance of Payments (BOP) situation in a given country may 
arise for a number of reasons and the risk of its aggravation onto a BOP crisis is 
always a possibility.103 One example of an unsustainable current account 
position is when the current account is in deficit, and the net imports of goods 
and services cannot be financed with a sufficient inflow of foreign capital or a 
reduction in foreign reserves. This may lead to an unsustainable BOP 
situation.104 The policy options available include improving the current account, 
                                          
100 Peter K. Cornelius, supra note 75. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 C. Thomas (2000), “Balance-of- Payments Crises in the Developing World: 
Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the NewEconomic Order”, Am. U. 
Int’l L. Rev. IV.  
104 World Trade Organization, Concept Paper On Balance-Of-Payments Safeguards, 
Working Group on The Relationship Between Trade AndInvestment, 
Communication From The European Community and its Member States, 
WT/WGTI/W/153, (2002) p 2. 
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for instance by expanding exports or restricting imports (provided these 
restrictions are compatible with its international obligations and preferably not 
counterproductive in terms of future developmental objectives) etc. “In seeking 
to avoid serious BOP difficulties, governments have sometimes taken restrictive 
measures on current transfers as well as on capital movements”.105  
As discussed above, GATS Art XI mandates WTO members to allow 
movement of capital in line with the commitment obligations of the Member 
state. In principle, a member’s market access commit ents oblige it to allow a 
certain degree of capital mobility – specifically, when the cross-border 
movement of capital is an essential part of the servic  itself and inflows of 
capital are related to commercial presence. Neverthel ss, the agreement allows a 
member to impose restrictions on current or capital transactions in the event of 
serious balance of payments or external financial dfficulties or the threat 
thereof.106 This is what is stated under Art XII of the GATS Agreement, 
(Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments).107 
To a very large extent, this article applies the same terms, conditions and 
procedures defined by the GATT for the invocation of Balance-of-payments 
Safeguards Provisions.108 As in GATT Article XVIII,109 there is recognition in 
                                          
105 Ibid. 
106 The GATT also contains similar provisions that address financial stability concerns 
regarding a member’s right to derogate from liberalization commitments when it is 
suffering a severe balance of payments imbalances. S e General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Articles XII and XVIII:B.; Also see Annex 1A of the 
Marrakech Agreement, Multilateral Agreements On Trade In Goods, Understanding 
on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (1994). 
107 Article XII Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payment; (1) states  - “In the 
event of serious  balance-of-payments and external fi ncial difficulties or threat 
thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain restrictions  trade in services on which 
it has undertaken specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for 
transactions related to such commitments…” Importantly, sub-article 3 provides, - 
“In determining the incidence of such restrictions, Members may give priority to the 
supply of services which are more essential to their economic or development 
programmes. However, such restrictions shall not be adopted or maintained for the 
purpose of protecting a particular service sector.” 
108 See GATT Art XII. 
109 See Article XV paragraphs 4 and 9.  Paragraph 4 specifically provides: “Contracting 
parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this 
agreement…” Article XV, Paragraph 9(a) provides  Nothing in this Agreement shall 
preclude: (a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange 
restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund … 
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the GATS that a developing country Member may need to use trade restrictions 
in order to ensure the maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for 
the implementation of its programme of economic development, and in the 
GATS this provision extends also to economies in tra sition.110 Generally, in the 
event of serious balance-of-payments and external fi ncial difficulties or threat 
thereof, a Member may restrict trade in services on which it has undertaken 
specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for transactions 
related to such commitments.111 The restrictions should be non-discriminatory, 
consistent with the IMF Articles of Agreement, temporary and phased-out 
progressively. Such restrictions should also avoid unnecessary damage to the 
commercial, economic and financial interests of other Members, should not 
exceed what is necessary to address the balance-of-payments problem, and 
should not be used to protect specific industries or sectors.112  
A number of important features of Article XII are worth noting. First of all, 
Article XII:1 clearly gives WTO Members with developing or transitional 
economies an autonomy to take measures that provide a level of financial 
reserves “adequate” for that particular Member’s programme of economic 
transition or development. Thus, Art XII:1 affirms that development goals are 
the legitimate basis for a WTO Member in determining the kinds of balance of 
payments measures it needs. Whereas the measures must “not exceed those 
necessary” to deal with “serious balance-of-payments and external financial 
difficulties or threat thereof,” Art XII: 3 affirms that a Member “may give 
priority to the supply of services which are more essential to their economic or 
development programmes.” The concept of “necessity” ought to be interpreted 
in the context of Art XII as a whole, which gives considerable emphasis to an 
individual Member’s approach to development. There is also ample room to 
                                          
110 WTO, Concept Paper On Balance-Of-Payments Safeguards, Communication From 
The European Community And Its Member States, WT/WGTI/W/153 (28 
November 2002) p 4. 
          GATS Art XII (1) second sentences which states “It is recognized that particular 
pressures on the balance of payments of a Member in the process of economic 
development or economic transition may necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, 
inter alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for the 
implementation of its programme of economic development or economic transition.” 
111 For instance the GATT interpretive notes make clear th t the intent of paragraph 4 is 
not to limit the ability of countries to impose exchange controls when they are 
considered warranted by the IMF, but rather to ensure that countries do not use 
exchange actions as a way to get around the intent of the substantive GATT 
provisions such as those in Article XI. 
112 World Trade Organization (2002), Exceptions and Balance-Of-Payments Safeguards, 
Note by the Secretariat, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and 
Investment, WT/WGTI/W/137, p 8. 
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read Art XII so as not to require a Member to use alt rnative policy measures, 
even if less restrictive of services trade, where those measures undermine the 
objectives set by the Member’s development program.113 
At this juncture, reading GATS Art XII together with he language of XI: 2, 
indicates an extremely important difference between GATT and GATS. That is, 
no matter how narrowly or restrictively interpreted, the relevant provisions of 
the GATT contain only disciplines on ‘current account’ measures. However, 
under GATS, a Member’s specific commitments may notprevent it from 
instituting ‘capital account’ controls. This nature of GATS Art XI & XII 
exceptions makes it one of the most important provisi ns that install policy 
space and flexibility into the system.114  
The imposition of restrictions on current or capital tr nsactions in the event 
of serious balance-of payments and external financial difficulties or the threat 
thereof is thus generally permitted. This would allow members in serious 
balance of payments difficulties – or threatened by such difficulties – to restrict 
trade in services for which they have undertaken market accesses commitments. 
Hence, such restrictions may be utilized by developing countries, or countries in 
transition, if such measures are necessary to maintain a level of reserves 
adequate for the prudent management of their economies.115 These restrictions, 
however, must not discriminate among members, cause unn cessary damage to 
the trading interests of other members, or be unnecessarily restrictive, and 
should be temporarily phased out as the situation improves.116 Although the 
restrictions may possibly focus on a particular sector, they must not be used or 
maintained as a protectionist trade barrier.117 It is also important to notice the 
                                          
113 Robert Howse (2008), Pursuing Sustainable Development Strategies: The cas of the 
balance of payment rules in the WTO, NYU Law School, pp 26 -27. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Kern Alexander (2003), The World Trade Organization and Financial Stability: The 
Balance between Liberalization and Regulation in the GATS, Cambridge 
Endowment for Research in Finance, p 20.  
116 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Art XII sub 2 primarily mentions - 
(c) shall avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial 
interests of any other Member; (d) shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the 
circumstances described in paragraph 1. 
117 Generally, the burden of proof while invoking the prudential carve out - like any 
exception - rests with the country taking the prudential measure. Accordingly, the 
prudential exception is limited by certain good faith requirements including the 
requirement that ‘such measures shall not be used a a means of avoiding the 
Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreem nt’. See Anne van Aaken 
and Jurgen Kurtz, Prudence or Discrimination? Emergency Measures, TheGlobal 
Financial Crisis and International Economic Law, Journal of International 
Economic Law 12(4), 859–894, p 876 Also see Bart De M ester, The Global 
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institutional accountability framework as restrictions adopted pursuant to Article 
XII must be reviewed periodically by the WTO Balance of Payments 
Committee.118 
3.2.2. The Ethiopian Case  
Ethiopia has experienced chronic balance of payments difficulties since the 
Imperial era, with the exception of a few periods.119 The major factor in the 
deteriorating balance of payments was and still is the worsening situation of 
merchandise trade. This situation persisted for deca s and the trade deficit that 
existed during the imperial years continued to grow after two revolutions, 
despite the introduction of various adjustment measures including import 
controls or export promotion.120  
A typical means by which foreign financial institutons can exacerbate the 
above situation and hence cause greater financial instability is by lending in 
foreign currencies. This leads to the payment and repayment of loans in foreign 
exchange which increases the rate of inflow and outflow of international capital. 
When this results in an imbalanced exchange between local and foreign 
currencies, it puts the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves under 
pressure, particularly if the loans are short-term. Thus, “too much demand for 
foreign exchange increases the balance of payments d ficit and with it the risk 
of exchange rate and financial instability”.121  
What is said to be difficult to predict after liberalization efforts have been 
undertaken is “how branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial firms and their 
headquarters will behave in times of financial crises”122 – especially in 
developing countries.123 Various studies have been undertaken to evaluate 
                                                                                                 
Financial Crisis and Government Support For Banks: What Role For the GATS?, 
Journal of International Economic Law 13(1), 27–63 
118 Article XII sub 5.  
119 National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Report - 2008/9, Economic Research and 
Monetary Policy Directorate, 2009, pp. 3, 62. 
120 <http://www.mongabay.com/history/ethiopia/ethiopia-
balance_of_payments_and_foreign_assistance.html>   
121 M. Vander Stichele (2004), Critical Issues In The Financial Sector, SOMO sector 
report (full report at www.somo.nl: publications), (2004) p. 19;  Also see A. 
Cornford, The  WTO negotiations  on  financial  services : current issues  and  future  
directions, Paper for the Financial Markets Center.  
122 Halfan Mkiwa (2007), The Anticipated Impact of GATS on The Financial Servic  
Industry In Africa, University Of The Western Cape-Cape Town, South Africa, p. 
59. 
123 Generally see Thomas, Chantal (2000). Balance-of-Payments Crises in the 
Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New 
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whether foreign source capital and its holders would panic and abruptly move 
out upon the first signs of crisis as they did in East Asia in 1997? “Or will they 
be able to resist the crisis with capital flowing i from the headquarters?”124 
In the late Argentinean crisis, studies have shown that “foreign banks refused 
to recapitalize their branches and subsidiaries”.125 Most East Asian countries 
have not been able to borrow in their own currency, which means “that they are 
continuously exposed to problems that triggered thecrisis in 1997”.126 
Generally, current empirical studies in relation to banking crises have been able 
to identify “channels of transmission through which financial liberalization may 
exert an influence on banking stability”.127 
Considering the above, it might be wise to expect tha smaller economies 
such as Ethiopia can be more vulnerable to capital movements that result in 
financial volatility and destabilization of domestic bank credit.128 In the GATS 
accession offers and negotiations, it is important o consider that cross-border e-
banking and buying foreign products – or even securities – through internet,129 
                                                                                                 
Economic Order. American University International Law Review 15, no. 6, p 1249-
1277. 
124 See Myriam Vander Stichele, The Risks of Financial Service Liberalization For 
Financial Stability, <www.somo.nl>  
125 Generally however empirical evidence for developing countries is in favor of a 
“stability-enhancing” role for international banks in periods of local financial crises. 
See Christian Tietje t al, supra note 85, p 12. 
126 Halfan Mkiwa, supra note 122 above. Or on the other hand, other studies in relation 
to the recent financial crisis has shown the reverse of the above situation.  According 
to Ibrahim Zeidy, “The financial meltdown suffered by the parent banks following 
market capitalisation losses was not passed down to their African subsidiaries. In 
fact, some subsidiaries of foreign banks saw considerable increases in their market 
capitalisation. For example, Swaziland Ned bank, Bank of Africa Benin and 
Standard Bank of Ghana saw their market capitalisation increase between July 2007 
and January 2009. Therefore, the contagious effect o  the financial meltdown is 
weak compared to the effect on parent banks”  
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge/Financial%20
crisis_Impacts%20on%20Africa.pdf> (last accessed: May 2012) Also see AfDB, 
The Current Financial Crisis: Impact on African Economies, Briefing note prepared 
for Ministerial Conference on the Financial Crisis, Nov, 12, 2008. 
127 J.-P. Allegret, B. Courbis, Ph. Dulbecco (2003), Financial Liberalization and 
Stability of the Financial System in Emerging Markets: The Institutional Dimension 
of Financial Crises, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(Feb., 2003), p 75. 
128 Normally, foreign banks may repatriate all the profits to the parent country.  
Moreover, if lending rates rise in the parent country and/or profit rates decline in the 
host country, foreign banks may withdraw their investment. 
129 This would be ‘Mode 1’ under GATS. 
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typically involve cross-border capital movements and foreign currencies which 
puts the country at potentially risky situations. Ethiopia is thus expected to 
negotiate the appropriate undertaking considering the existing overall situation 
by prudently avoiding risks and distinguishing betwen what limitations should 
be sought after and which ones should not. This is because some kinds of 
(outbound) capital controls might be viewed as conditions which should be 
bound under GATS schedules of commitments.  
Typical instances are, conditions on who can supply services (number of 
service suppliers) in violation of XVI: 2(a), or as“limitations on the total value 
of service transactions or assets” in violation of XVI: 2 (b) or “total number of 
service operations or the total quantity of service output” in violation of 
XVI:2(c). This possibility arises from the extremely broad interpretation of 
XVI:2(a) and (c) by the Appellate Body in the US-Gambling case.130 The 
Appellate Body suggested that to violate either provisi n, measures need not 
take the explicit forms described in those provisions provided they have 
comparable effects on restricting market access and are quantitative in nature.131 
Since capital account controls are clearly measures that are quantitative in 
nature they may well have effects on the number of service suppliers, the total 
value of services transactions or assets under Art. XVI. 132  However, speaking of 
GATS rules, we can say that GATS provisions provide th  Ethiopian 
Government with sufficient domestic policy space to implement its financial 
stability objectives. 
3.3. Macroeconomic Policy 
Despite an overwhelmingly broad understanding of servic s in the WTO and 
hence GATS, the services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, 
including activities conducted by a central bank or monetary authority or by any 
other public entity in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate policies are entirely 
excluded from the scope of the GATS.  
One of its principal provisions in the discussion of financial services is 
GATS Article I. This provision excludes services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority, the activities of central banks or other authorities 
carrying out monetary or exchange rate policies. GATS rt I:3 (b) provides that, 
‘services’ includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority. According to Art I:3 (c); ‘a service supplied 
in the exercise of governmental authority’ means any service which is supplied 
                                          
130Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, (WT/DS285/AB/R), Report of the Appellate 
Body, paragraphs 232, 247. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Robert Howse, supra note 113, pp 6-7. 
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neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service 
suppliers. In the words of, Patrick Low and Aaditya M ttoo, et al, “when a 
central bank conducts open market operations, for example, conditions in the 
financial sector could be affected through the impact of such interventions on 
the money supply, interest rates or exchange rates. These types of interaction 
fall entirely outside the ambit of the GATS.”133 
The exclusion of foreign service suppliers also extends to activities which 
form part of statutory social security or public retir ment plans, or other 
activities that are carried out by a public entity on behalf of the government, or 
using government financial resources, provided that domestic non-governmental 
financial suppliers are also not allowed to take part in these activities.134 The 
agreement also allows a member to pursue other domestic policy objectives 
through, for instance, directed lending programs, provided that the measures are 
neither discriminatory nor intended to restrict the access of suppliers to a 
market.135 
In the Ethiopian context, the National Bank of Ethiopia regulates the money 
supply, interest rates, exchange rates or various other macroeconomic 
functions.136 Considering the central place that these measures have in the on-
going economic policy in the country, the National B nk of Ethiopia and other 
relevant government agencies will still be able to maintain such kind of 
macroeconomic activities after accession irrespectiv  of the form of accession 
commitments the country has granted. This is mainly because, services supplied 
in the exercise of governmental authority, including activities conducted by a 
national bank, central bank or monetary authority or by any other public entity 
in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate policies are excluded from the scope of 
the GATS.137  
Another instance is where the Ethiopian government may wish to maintain 
other rules and regulations that influence the operations of markets and 
competition in market, such as for example, a requir ment to lend to certain 
                                          
133 Patrick Low et al (1997), “Opening Markets in Financial Services and the Role of 
The GATS”, WTO Special Studies, p 3. 
134 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Financial Services Art 1 (b), 
Scope and Definition. 
135 Rudolf Adlung et al (2002), The GATS: Key Features and Sectors (in) Bernard 
Hoekman et al (eds.), Development, Trade, And The WTO: A Handbook, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. pp 259-279. 
136 Proclamation No. 591/2008, Articles 5 (4), 5 (5-6 and 9-10) and 19-21; and See 
National Bank of Ethiopia (2007), Interest Rates Directive No. NBE/INT/10/2007.  
137 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Art I: 3, General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, Annex on Financial Services Art 1 (b), Scope and Definition. Also see, 
Wendy Dobson, supra note 84 above. 
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sectors or individuals, or lending mandated on the basis of preferential interest 
rates for certain types of lending. Even though such measures sometimes have 
been argued against for not being the most efficient means of achieving 
particular objectives, these policies are not necessarily subject to GATS 
commitments. “If they are neither discriminatory nor intended to restrict the 
access of foreign suppliers to a market, then such domestic regulatory measures 
would be permitted provided they met certain basic criteria, such as impartiality 
and objectivity”.138 
 3.4. Financial Market Liberalization and Prudential Regulation 
The aims of GATS can potentially provoke concern that its rules might 
compromise the ability of governments to pursue legitimate regulatory and 
prudent measures or might limit their freedom to achieve other domestic policy 
objectives. Most of these concerns seem to have been alr ady addressed under 
GATS rules.139  
None of the GATS provisions prevent a member from taking measures for 
prudential reasons, for example, to protect investors or depositors or to ensure 
the integrity and stability of the financial system.140 In particular, the prudential 
‘carve-out’ for domestic regulation of financial services, under Art 2 of 
Financial Services Annex, allows a country to take prudential measures for the 
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a 
fiduciary duty is owed or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial 
system regardless of any other provisions of the GATS. Thus prudential 
measures could, in principle, be inconsistent with a country’s national treatment 
or market access commitments or its Most Favoured Nation obligation. 
While these sorts of exceptions are common in the WTO Agreements,141 the 
prudential carve-out here differs from other exceptions for domestic policy 
contained in the GATT and GATS in one very significant respect. In contrast to 
health and safety, for example, where only ‘necessary’ measures can be raised 
                                          
138  Wendy Dobson, Ibid, p 293; General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Art 
VI. 
139 But see Lazaros E Panourgias, Banking Regulation and World Trade Law, GATS, 
EU and ‘Prudential’ Institution Building, Oxford (2006) Chapter III. 
140 There is no definition of what it means by ‘prudential’ objectives under GATS or 
any of the other agreements under the WTO. For the moment this is left for the 
GATS adjudicatory body (dispute settlement body) to interpret what sort of 
measures fall under this notion. 
141 See Art XX of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, General Exceptions, Art 
XXIV of GATS General Exceptions, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Art 73, and Security Exceptions etc. 
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as an exception under Article XXIV of GATS,142 here all prudential measures 
are exceptions to the rule under GATS Art XI and hence can be claimed without 
the need to prove necessity.143 As a result, a prudential measure may not be 
challenged on the ground that it is not ‘necessary’ o  ‘least trade restrictive.’ 
Moreover, “the prudential carve-out overrides the requirements for domestic 
regulations in GATS Article VI (Domestic Regulation)”.144 
 3.4.1 The Ethiopian case 
As discussed above, GATS recognizes that governments may find it necessary 
to exercise considerable regulatory control over the activities of banks, 
insurance companies and other financial institutions. Its Annex on Financial 
Services therefore provides that the liberalization commitments undertaken 
should not prevent them from taking measures for prudential reasons, including 
the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or to ensure the integrity 
and stability of the financial system. Although the Annex does not give details 
as to what constitutes prudential measures, licensing requirements intended to 
ensure business competence and financial integrity, minimum capital 
requirements and regular accounting requirements would ordinarily be 
considered prudential measures. Accordingly the Nation l Bank of Ethiopia 
                                          
142 See for instance Art XXIV of GATS General Exceptions states; Subject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
Member of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public 
order; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent  with the 
provisions of this Agreement.. 
143 Meester, B.de, Testing European Prudential Conditions for Banking Mergers in 
Light of Most Favoured in the GATS, Journal of International Economic Law II 
(2008) pp 609-647. 
144 Sydney J. Key (2003), supra note 63 above. She reiterates, “The absence of a 
necessity test does not, however, resolve the issueof whether a measure is prudential 
or is being used to avoid the obligations of the agreement. An allegedly prudential 
measure that violates a country’s obligations or commitments under the GATS 
might be challenged on the grounds that its purpose is r ally trade restrictive rather 
than prudential and therefore it does not fall within t e scope of the prudential carve-
out.” Also See Diemo Dietrich et al (2010), Liberalization and Rules on Regulation 
in the field of Financial Services in Bilateral Trade and Regional Integration 
Agreements, Institute of Economic Law (TELC), Martin Luther University Halle-
Wittenberg, p. 12. 
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(NBE) can keep regulating financial institutions in the above terms after 
accession irrespective of any commitment scenario upon accession. 
Below is a brief review of some of the major prudential regulatory measures 
that are currently being practised under the supervision of the National Bank of 
Ethiopia.145 A brief evaluation is made whether these measures can be 
accommodated within the bounds of GATS prudential crve-out thereby 
allowing policy space for the government upon accession. 
  a) Establishment and structural requirements  
Ethiopian law mandates private banks, insurers and Micro Financial Institutions 
(MFIs) to be incorporated as share companies.146 It, among others, mandates all 
banks to get a banking business license, including branch permits, from the 
National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and to notify the latter on their new branching 
decisions to the latter.147 A bank to which a license is granted is required to 
“fulfill, before commencing operation, sound information management and 
internal control systems, risk management policies and procedures, and human 
resource organization and such other essential obligations to carry out banking 
business as determined by the directive to be issued by the National Bank”.148 
The NBE is also authorized to impose qualification, fit ess and propriety criteria 
on influential shareholders of the banks and directors and on chief (and senior) 
executives of the banks.  
These establishment and structural requirements are compatible with the 
GATS rules as long as they are based on objective and tr nsparent criteria, not 
                                          
145 It is beyond the purpose of this note to discuss the appropriate content of prudential 
regulation or the means of adequate supervision of financial institutions. For a 
detailed synthesis on the subject please see IMF, nternational Capital Markets, 
IMF, Washington, D.C, (1998) This study describes the overall developments in 
prudential regulation and banking supervision in the world. Major international 
achievements have also been made by the various international institutions to 
improve regulatory and supervisory standards across c untries.  In this regard the 
activities of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision in developing prudential 
standards for banking are extensive and well-documented. See BIS, Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank 
for International Settlements, Basle (1997).   
146 Primarily see Commercial Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, 1960, Title VI. Also see 
Article 513; Proclamation No 592/2008, Article 4. 
147 Proclamation No 626/2009, Article 6 (5); Proclamation No 592/2008, Article 3 (3) 1/ 
It is prohibited to transact banking business in Ethiopia without obtaining a banking 
business license from the National Bank. 2/ No person shall use the word ‘bank’ or 
its derivatives as part of the name of any financial institution unless it has obtained a 
license from the National Bank. 
148 Proclamation No 592/2008, Article 6. 
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more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of service, and less trade 
restrictive, as the GATS requires. But, with respect to the form and type of 
organizations allowed to operate banking business, it eems wise to include the 
rules under the Ethiopian Commercial Code and the Banking Proclamation in 
the commitment schedules. For instance, Cape Verde maintained a market 
access exception that commercial presence must take the form of a limited 
liability company, or as provided for in the financial services head note of the 
respective schedule.149 This aspect of the regulatory system is out of the
exception given to measures falling under the prudential carve-out. This 
objective can also be achieved by enlisting a general condition under the 
financial services schedule whereby the concerned regulatory tools and the 
institutions can easily be enlisted. For instance, th  services schedule of Nepal 
maintains the following: 
“[T]he commitments in financial services are made in accordance with 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Ann x on Financial 
Services. All the commitments are subject to entry requirements, 
domestic laws, rules and regulations and the terms and conditions of the 
Nepal Rastra Bank (the central bank of Nepal) and any other competent 
authority in Nepal, as the case may be, which are consistent with 
Article VI of the GATS and paragraph 2 of the Annex on Financial 
Services.” 150 
  b) Operational and disclosure requirements  
Financial services providers in Ethiopia are generally obliged to comply with 
directives issued by the National Bank on “minimum aounts of capital and 
reserves to be maintained by banks and the rules for their computation” shall be 
determined by the latter.151 Article 29 of the Banking Proclamation also 
empowers the National Bank to periodically or at any time, without prior notice, 
make, or cause to be made, an on-site inspection of a y bank.  With respect to 
disclosure rules, it is notable that transparency in the banking sector is, 
compared to other sectors or the general commerce, better regulated and 
monitored in the country. The National Bank of Ethiopia is given a mandate to 
                                          
149 As discussed above in Section (3), the financial services head note maintains that 
Cape Verde will permit the establishment of branches for committed sub-sectors in 
insurance, banking and securities within 10 years from the date of Cape Verde's 
Accession. See Cape Verde, Report of The Working Party on The Accession of Cape 
Verde: Addendum, Part II - Schedule of Specific Commit ents in Services List of 
Article II MFN Exemptions, WT/ACC/CPV/30/Add.2. 
150 World Trade Organizations, Trade in Services, The Kingdom of Nepal, Schedule of 
Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/139 (2004). 
151 Proclamation No 592/2008, Article 18. 
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see into the compliance of these sectors with their disclosure and transparency 
obligations.152 Among many, the working regulation empowers the NBE to see 
that banks keep records and accounts following interna ional financial 
statements standards,153 to have their assets valued by government approved 
experts, to have their accounts audited by independent auditors appointed upon 
approval of the NBE or the government,154 and to report the state of their 
financial activities and affairs to the NBE, their customers and the general 
public annually and as may be required by the NBE. The NBE is also authorized 
to lay down auditing standards,155 and impose an obligation on banking services 
providers to provide their audited annual balance sh ets and profit and loss 
accounts in accessible places of businesses, etc.156 Understandably, all these 
measures are not incompatible with the GATS since they are meant to protect 
the financial institutions, investors, consumers and the general public against 
fraud. 
  c)  Prudence and performance requirements  
Article 18 of the Banking Proclamation empowers NBE to set the minimum 
amounts of capital and reserves that should be maintained by banks and the 
rules for their computation.157 The same Proclamation provides that “the 
National Bank may prescribe different capital and rese ve requirements to be 
maintained by different banks depending on their risk profile.”158 Accordingly, 
the NBE has issued various directives aimed at providing prudence and 
performance requirements. They include Directive No. Sbb-50-11 on minimum 
capital requirement for Banks, Licensing and Supervision of Banking Business, 
Directive No. SBB/4/95 and SBB/37/2004 Reserve Requirement on Legal 
Reserves, Licensing and Supervision of Banking Busines, Directive No. 
SBB/12/1996 Limitation on Investment of Banks, Directive No. SBB/39/2006 
                                          
152 National Bank of Ethiopia Establishment (as amended) Proclamation No. 591/2008. 
      Micro-Financing Business Proclamation No. 626/2009. 
153 Banking Business Proclamation No. 592/2008, Article 23. 
154 Ibid, Article 24. 
155 Banking Business Proclamation No. 592/2008 Article 26. 
156 Generally see Article 28 (titled Disclosure of Information) of the Banking Business 
Proclamation No. 592/2008. It provides the following: (1) Every bank shall, within a 
time period to be determined by the National Bank, send to the National Bank duly 
signed financial statements and other reports as pre cribed by it. (2) Every bank 
shall: a) exhibit at every place of its business, including its branches, in a 
conspicuous place throughout the year, a copy of the last audited balance sheet and 
profit and loss account in respect of all of its operations; b) cause such balance sheet 
and profit and loss account, together with the notes thereto, to be published in a 
newspaper of wide circulation. 
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Amendment for New Bank Licensing on Approval of Directors and CEOs, and 
Directive Sbb-44-08 Liquidity Requirement (3rd replacement). The Banking 
Business Proclamation separates the banking businesses from non-banking and 
other commercial activities and the insurance businesses from non-insurance 
activities.159 It also requires banks to adhere to single borrowe limits to 
diversify their investments as the NBE prescribes.160  
Having seen the nature of the above legal instruments a d prudential 
supervision from the National Bank, one might wonder whether GATS rules 
will prohibit such kinds of government interventions i  the financial sector. The 
aforementioned regulations in Ethiopia are not incompatible with the GATS 
since they have the purpose of protecting the prudence and stability of the 
financial system against contagion and the GATS do not prescribe and impose 
particular regulatory provisions on domestic regulations. It does not also put a 
limit on the choice and preferences of how a member would like to discipline its 
banks or the functioning of the entire economy as long as the measures 
employed are not discriminatory and thus act as a di guised trade barrier. 161 
On final note, if Ethiopia’s negotiators/regulators are concerned about 
whether a particular measure would be generally accepted as prudential, there is 
the option of listing that measure as a limitation when making initial market 
access and national treatment commitments, thereby avoiding the need to rely 
on the prudential carve-out. This seems preferable considering the different 
positions of member states as to what sort of measur s fall under the prudential 
                                          
159 Proclamation No 592/2008, Art 22 (2), 50; Licensing and Supervision Of Banking 
Business, Directive No. SBB/12/1996; which inter alia provides; 1, No bank shall 
engage in insurance business but may hold up to 20% in an insurance company and 
up to a total of 10% of the bank’s equity capital in such business. 2. Banks are 
prohibited from engaging directly in non-banking businesses such as agriculture, 
industry, and commerce. 3. A bank may hold shares in a non-banking business only 
up to 20% of the company’s share capital and total holdings in such business shall 
not exceed10%. 
160 Proclamation No 591/2008, Art 15 (1) lit. a and (2); Proclamation No. 592/2008, Art. 
22 (1); Proclamation No 86/1994, Arts 14, 42 lit. e and f; Proclamation No 
626/2009, Arts. 3 (1), 14 (2) lit. a and d and 16; Directives National Bank of 
Ethiopia, Licensing and Supervision of Banking Business Directiv  No SBB/16/1996 
on Amendment of Single Borrower Loan Limit Directive No SBB/8/1995 (1996); 
National Bank of Ethiopia, Licensing and Supervision of Banking Business Directive 
No. SBB/29/2002 on Amendment of Single Borrower Loan Limit, 13 May 2002; 
National Bank of Ethiopia, Licensing and Supervision of Insurance Business 
Directive No SIB/25/2004 on Investment of Insurance Funds, (2004). 
161 Bart De Meester (2010), The Global Financial Crisis And Government Support For 
Banks: What Role For The GATS?, Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 13 
No. 1, p 48. 
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exception. For instance, some WTO members imposed len ing and other 
operating limits based on branch capital-equivalency requirements; Korea and 
Turkey, for example, listed the measures as limitations in their schedules of 
commitments, which could be interpreted as an acknowledgement that the 
measures may not be generally accepted as prudential. By contrast, there are 
members that imposed the measures but did not list them as limitations in their 
schedules; Chile for example, clearly believed that e measures are within the 
scope of the prudential carve-out.162 The EU practice shows that branches (as 
opposed to subsidiaries) of third-country financial f rms are, in general, not 
subject to harmonized EU prudential measures and that each member state may 
therefore impose its own measures for prudential purposes.163 This shows that 
members have different views towards what sort of measures are prudential and 
thus need not be schedules based on the annex on fina cial services. Thus, 
Ethiopia should not take any risk if a particular measure (which is not 
anticipated during accession) can possibly be challenged on prudential grounds; 
and should thus have it scheduled. 
Conclusion 
This article began with a brief discussion on the central role of the negotiation 
on financial services in Ethiopia’s accession bid to the WTO. In doing so, the 
article did not discuss the macroeconomic relevance and market efficiency 
emplacements of financial services liberalization, whether within and outside 
the WTO system. Rather the central inquiry in this article focused on whether 
Ethiopia can maintain the existing status-quo and hold back on any GATS 
commitments in financial services so as to retain the freedom to pursue certain 
domestic policy and regulatory objectives. 
These concerns are legitimate mainly for two reasons. Primarily, financial 
services play key roles in any economy, including Ethiopia, while at the same 
time the risk of market failures in the services sector is equally high. State 
regulation in financial services is thus expedient. Acceding WTO member 
countries such as Ethiopia make sure that the relevant WTO instruments are 
flexible enough to allow sufficient level of macroeconomic and regulatory 
autonomy. The second reason relates to the recent worldwide financial crisis 
which clearly shows the potential vulnerabilities of the highly liberalized, 
deregulated and overwhelmingly intermingled financil systems of the western 
world. Important pressures have thus emerged pushing countries all over the 
world to rethink and maintain the regulatory role of the government in the 
financial services market. 
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The discourse on the cause, nature and degree of these risks and their 
ultimate solutions is still underway. No one can possibly know precisely where 
and how the next global crisis will unfold or what measures national 
governments should take to protect their economies from a global contagion. In 
this extremely fluid and unpredictable situation, it is thus essential that 
governments retain the necessary policy space. 
With regard to Ethiopia’s WTO accession package, th evaluation of the 
WTO framework and the GATS obligations in financial services demonstrates 
that commitments under GATS need not compromise the ability of the 
Ethiopian Government to pursue sound regulatory and macroeconomic policies. 
A review of the relevant obligations in this article shows that states acceding to 
the system will  still be left with considerable freedom to achieve macroeconomic 
and regulatory policy objectives. After examining the possible commitment 
scenarios which Ethiopia can possibly commit to, it is argued that there exists no 
definite reason why GATS commitments on financial services will have to 
compromise Ethiopia’s ability to pursue sound regulatory and macro-economic 
policies.                                                                                                        ■ 
                     
